

of any changes in schedule, etc., that may have occurred.

Dated: October 8, 1997.

Sam Duraiswamy,

Chief, Nuclear Reactors Branch.

[FR Doc. 97-27239 Filed 10-14-97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards; Subcommittee Meeting on Safety Research Program; Notice of Meeting

The ACRS Subcommittee on Safety Research Program will hold a meeting on November 4-5, 1997, Room T-2B3, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland.

The entire meeting will be open to public attendance.

The agenda for the subject meeting shall be as follows:

Tuesday, November 4, 1997—8:30 a.m. until the conclusion of business.

Wednesday, November 5, 1997—8:30 a.m. until the conclusion of business.

The Subcommittee will discuss the NRC Safety Research Program, industry research activities, and related matters, and gather information for preparing a draft annual report to Congress. The purpose of this meeting is to gather information, analyze relevant issues and facts, and to formulate proposed positions and actions, as appropriate, for deliberation by the full Committee.

Oral statements may be presented by members of the public with the concurrence of the Subcommittee Chairman; written statements will be accepted and made available to the Committee. Electronic recordings will be permitted only during those portions of the meeting that are open to the public, and questions may be asked only by members of the Subcommittee, its consultants, and staff. Persons desiring to make oral statements should notify the cognizant ACRS staff engineer named below five days prior to the meeting, if possible, so that appropriate arrangements can be made.

During the initial portion of the meeting, the Subcommittee, along with any of its consultants who may be present, may exchange preliminary views regarding matters to be considered during the balance of the meeting.

The Subcommittee will then hear presentations by and hold discussions with representatives of the NRC staff, Nuclear Energy Institute, Electric Power Research Institute, and other interested persons regarding this review.

Further information regarding topics to be discussed, whether the meeting has been cancelled or rescheduled, the Chairman's ruling on requests for the opportunity to present oral statements and the time allotted therefor can be obtained by contacting the cognizant ACRS staff engineer, Dr. Medhat El-Zeftawy (telephone 301/415-6889) between 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. (EDT). Persons planning to attend this meeting are urged to contact the above named individual one or two working days prior to the meeting to be advised of any potential changes in the proposed agenda, etc., that may have occurred.

Dated: October 8, 1997.

Sam Duraiswamy,

Chief, Nuclear Reactors Branch.

[FR Doc. 97-27240 Filed 10-14-97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Sunshine Act Meeting

AGENCY HOLDING THE MEETING: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

DATE: Weeks of October 13, 20, 27, and November 3, 1997.

PLACE: Commissioners' Conference Room, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland.

STATUS: Public and Closed.

MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED:

Week of October 13

Tuesday, October 14

10:00 a.m.

Briefing on EEO Program (Public Meeting)
(Contact: Ed Tucker, 301-415-7382)

1:00 p.m.

Briefing on Severe Accident Master
Integration Plan (Public Meeting)
(Contact: Charles Ader, 301-415-5622)

Wednesday, October 15

10:00 a.m.

Briefing on PRA Implementation Plan
(Public Meeting)
(Contact: Tom King, 301-415-5790)

11:30 a.m.

Affirmation Session (Public Meeting) (if needed)

Week of October 20—Tentative

There are no meetings the week of October 20.

Week of October 27—Tentative

Wednesday, October 29

11:30 a.m.

Affirmation Session (Public Meeting) (if needed)

2:00 p.m.

Briefing on Site Decommissioning Plan
(SDMP) (Public Meeting)

Week of November 3

Tuesday, November 4

2:00 p.m.

Meeting with Commonwealth Edison
(Public Meeting)

Wednesday, November 5

9:30 a.m.

Briefing on Staff's Plans for 50.59
Regulatory Process Improvements
(Public Meeting)

11:00 a.m.

Affirmation Session (Public Meeting) (if needed)

The schedule for Commission meetings is subject to change on short notice. To verify the status of meetings call: (Recording)—(301) 415-1292.

CONTACT PERSON FOR MORE INFORMATION:
Bill Hill (301) 415-1661.

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The NRC Commission Meeting Schedule can be found on the Internet at: <http://www.nrc.gov/SECY/smj/schedule.htm>

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This notice is distributed by mail to several hundred subscribers; if you no longer wish to receive it, or would like to be added to it, please contact the Office of the Secretary, Attn: Operations Branch, Washington, D.C. 20555 (301-415-1661).

In addition, distribution of this meeting notice over the Internet system is available. If you are interested in receiving this Commission meeting schedule electronically, please send an electronic message to wmh@nrc.gov or dkw@nrc.gov.

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Dated: October 10, 1997.

William M. Hill, Jr.,

SECY Tracking Officer, Office of the Secretary.

[FR Doc. 97-27474 Filed 10-10-97; 3:05 pm]

BILLING CODE 7590-01-M

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Draft Regulatory Guide and Standard Review Plan Section; Issuance, Availability, and Notice of Workshop

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Notice of availability and workshop.

SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued for public comment drafts of a regulatory guide and a Standard Review Plan Section. These issuances follow the Commission's August 16, 1995 (60 FR 42622) policy statement on the "Use of PRA Methods in Nuclear Regulatory

Activities." In June 1997, the NRC published for public comment (62 FR 34321) four draft guides, 3 standard review plans and a NUREG series document on the use of PRA in nuclear power reactor licensing. The NRC is developing guidance for power reactor licensees on acceptable methods for using probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) information and insights in support of plant-specific applications to change the current licensing basis (CLB) for inservice inspection of piping, known as risk-informed inservice inspection (RI-ISI) programs. The use of such PRA information and guidance will be voluntary. To facilitate comment, the Commission will conduct a workshop to explain the draft documents and answer questions. Section VI of this notice provides additional information on the scope, purpose and topics for discussion at the workshop.

DATES: The workshop will be held on November 19–20, 1997. Registration begins on November 18 at 3:00 p.m. The comment period expires January 13, 1998. Comments received after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but the Commission is able to assure consideration only for comments received on or before this date. Mail written comments to: Rules and Directives Branch, Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555–0001. Please (1) attach a diskette containing your comments, in either ASC11 text or Wordperfect format (Version 5.1 or 6.1), (2) or submit your comments electronically via the NRC Electronic Bulletin Board on FedWorld or the NRC's interactive rulemaking Website.

Deliver comments to 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, between 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. on Federal workdays.

Requests for free single copies of draft regulatory guide and standard review plan, to the extent of supply, may be made in writing to the Printing, Graphics and Distribution Branch, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555–0001, or by fax to (301) 415–5272. Copies of draft regulatory guide and the standard review plan section are available for inspection and copying for a fee at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L street N.W. (Lower Level), Washington, D.C. 20555–0001. Electronic copies of the draft document are also accessible on the NRC's interactive rulemaking web site through the NRC home page (<http://www.nrc.gov>). This site includes a facility to upload comments as files

(any format), if your web browser supports the function.

For more information on the NRC bulletin boards call Mr. Arthur Davis, Systems Integration and Development Branch, NRC, Washington, D.C. 20555–0001, telephone (301) 415–5780; e-mail axd3@nrc.gov. For information about the interactive rulemaking site, contact Ms. Carol Gallagher, (301) 415–5905; e-mail cag@nrc.gov.

ADDRESSES: The public workshop will be held at the Bethesda Marriott, 5151 Pooks Hill Road, Bethesda, Maryland; telephone (301) 897–9400.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jack Guttman, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, MS: T10–E50, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555–0001, (301) 415–7732, E-mail jxg@nrc.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

On August 16, 1995, the Commission published in the **Federal Register** (60 FR 42622) a final policy statement on the use of probabilistic risk assessment methods in nuclear regulatory activities. The policy statement included the following regarding NRC's expanded use of PRA.

1. The use of PRA technology should be increased in all regulatory matters to the extent supported by the state-of-the-art in PRA methods and data and in a manner that complements the NRC's deterministic approach and supports the NRC's traditional defense-in-depth philosophy.

2. PRA and associated analyses (e.g., sensitivity studies, uncertainty analyses, and importance measures) should be used in regulatory matters, where practical within the bounds of the state-of-the-art, to reduce unnecessary conservatism associated with current regulatory requirements, regulatory guides, license commitments, and staff practices. Where appropriate, PRA should be used to support proposals for additional regulatory requirements in accordance with 10 CFR 50.109 (backfit rule). Appropriate procedures for including PRA in the process for changing regulatory requirements should be developed and followed. It is, of course, understood that the intent of this policy is that existing rules and regulations shall be complied with unless these rules and regulations are revised.

3. PRA evaluations in support of regulatory decisions should be as realistic as practicable and appropriate supporting data should be publicly available for review.

4. The Commission's safety goals for nuclear power plants and subsidiary numerical objectives are to be used with appropriate consideration of uncertainties in making regulatory judgments on the need for proposing and backfitting new generic requirements on nuclear power plant licensees.

It was the Commission's intent that implementation of this policy statement would improve the regulatory process in three areas:

1. Enhancement of safety decisionmaking by the use of PRA insights,
2. More efficient use of agency resources, and
3. Reduction in unnecessary burdens on licensees.

To help implement the Commission's PRA Policy Statement, draft regulatory guides and Standard Review Plans (SRP) were developed in the areas of:

- General guidance,
- Inservice inspection (ISI),
- Inservice testing (IST),
- Technical specification (TS), and
- Graded quality assurance (GQA).

The draft regulatory guides provide a proposed acceptable approach for power reactor licensees to prepare and submit applications for plant-specific changes to the current licensing basis that utilize risk information. The draft standard review plans provide guidance to the NRC staff on the review of such applications. On June 25, 1997, all but the ISI draft regulatory guide and SRP were published for public comment (62 FR 34321).

This notice specifically seeks public comment on Draft Regulatory Guide DG–1063, "An Approach for Plant-Specific Decisionmaking: Inservice Inspection of Piping," and the accompanying draft Standard Review Plan Section 3.9.8, "Standard Review Plan for the Review of Risk-Informed Inservice Inspection of Piping." These documents are discussed in more detail below.

The draft guide and SRP are being developed to provide guidance to power reactor licensees and NRC staff reviewers on integrating risk information to support requests for changes in a plant's CLB for inservice inspection of piping. The regulatory guide describes a means by which licensees can propose plant-specific CLB changes under 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3)(I). Adopting the approach in this regulatory guide would be voluntary. Licensees submitting applications for changes to their CLB may use this approach or an equivalent approach. To encourage the use of risk

information in inservice inspection programs of piping, the staff intends to give priority to applications for burden reduction that use risk information as a supplement to traditional engineering analyses, consistent with the intent of the Commission's policy. All applications that improve safety will continue to receive high priority.

DG-1061, "An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Current Licensing Basis," and the draft SRP of Chapter 19 were developed to provide an overall framework and guidance that is applicable to any proposed CLB change when risk insights are used to support the change (62 FR 34321). The application-specific regulatory guide (RG) and SRP for ISI would build upon and supplement the general guidance contained in DG-1061 and provide additional guidance specific to inservice inspection programs of piping.

The guidance provided in these documents is designed to encourage licensees to use risk information by defining an acceptable framework for the use and integration of risk information on a plant-specific basis, while promoting consistency in PRA applications. It is expected that the long-term use of risk information in plant-specific licensing actions will result in improved safety by focusing attention on the more risk-significant aspects of plant design and operation. The draft guidance highlights to licensees acceptable methods and scope of analysis required to support the proposed changes to the plant's CLB.

II. Policy Issues

On May 15, 1996, the Commission requested the staff to recommend resolution of the following four policy issues associated with risk-informed changes to a plant's CLB:

- The role of performance-based regulation,
- Plant-specific application of safety goals,
- Risk neutral vs. increases in risk,
- Implementation of changes to risk-informed IST and ISI requirements.

These issues are applicable to RI-ISI programs. Public comments on these issues were requested in the June 25, 1997 FRN (62 FR 34321) under the heading, "Use of PRA in Plant Specific Reactor Regulatory Activities: Proposed Regulatory Guides, Standard Review Plan Sections, and Supporting NUREG." Comments provided on these issues in response to the June 25 FRN on related guides will be used by the staff in finalizing this guide as well. Comments

on these issues as they specifically apply to this guide are also requested.

III. Structure, Guidelines and Rationale for RG/SRP

The approach described in the DG-1063 and the draft SRP has four basic steps. These are:

- Define the proposed change;
- Perform an integrated engineering analysis (which includes both traditional engineering and risk analysis) and use an integrated decision process;
- Perform monitoring and feedback to verify assumptions and analysis; and
- Document and submit proposed change.

Five fundamental safety principles are described that should be met in each application for a change in the CLB. These principles are:

- The proposed change meets the current regulation. This principle applies unless the proposed change is explicitly related to a requested exemption or rule change (i.e., a 10 CFR 50.12 "specific exemption" or a 10 CFR 2.802 "petition for rulemaking");
- Defense-in-depth is maintained;
- Sufficient safety margins are maintained;
- Proposed increases in risk, and their cumulative effect, are small and do not cause the NRC safety goals to be exceeded;
- Performance-based implementation and monitoring strategies are proposed that address uncertainties in analysis models and data and provide for timely feedback and corrective action.

These principles represent fundamental safety practices that the staff believes must be retained in any change to a plant's CLB to maintain reasonable assurance that there is no undue risk to public health and safety. Each of these principles is to be considered in the analysis and integrated decisionmaking process.

The guidelines for assessing risk proposed in the draft guide and draft SRP are derived from the Commission's safety goal quantitative health objectives (QHOs). Specifically, the subsidiary objectives of core damage frequency (CDF) and large early release frequency (LERF) are used as the measures of risk against which changes in the CLB will be assessed, in lieu of the QHOs themselves, which require level 3 PRA information (offsite health effects). These measures were chosen to simplify the scope of PRA analysis needed, to avoid the large uncertainties associated with level 3 PRA analysis, and to be

consistent with previous Commission direction to decouple siting from plant design. These values are described in the June 25, 1997 **Federal Register** Notice (62 FR 34321) on "Use of PRA in Plant Specific Reactor Regulatory Activities: Proposed Regulatory Guides, Standard Review Plan Sections, and Supporting NUREG."

IV. Comments

The staff is soliciting comments related to the guidance described in the draft regulatory guide DG-1063 and SRP Section 3.9.8. Comments submitted by the readers of this FRN will help ensure that these draft documents have appropriate scope, depth, quality, and effectiveness. Alternative views, concerns, clarifications, and corrections expressed in public comments will be considered in developing the final documents.

V. Workshop

The Commission will conduct a workshop on November 19 and 20, 1997, to discuss and explain the material contained in the draft guide and SRP, and to answer questions and receive comments and feedback on the proposed documents. The purpose of the workshop is to facilitate the comment process. In the workshop, the staff will describe each document, its basis, and solicit comment and feedback on its completeness, correctness and usefulness. Since these documents cover a wide range of technical areas, many topics will be discussed. Listed below are topics on which discussion and feedback are sought at the workshop:

(A) Is the level of detail in the guidance contained in the proposed regulatory guide and SRP clear and sufficient, or is more detailed guidance necessary? What level of detail is needed.

(B) Is it acceptable to use qualitative information (e.g., not quantifying the change in risk— Δ CDF and Δ LERF) to propose changes in ISI programs? If so, does DG-1063 provide adequate guidance in this regard? Can qualitative assessments be used to identify and categorize piping segments as high, medium and low safety significant? How? What are the limitations of such an approach?

(C) Under the risk-informed approach, what is the appropriate size of the sample of welds or piping segment areas that should be inspected? What should the criteria be for selecting the sample size?

(D) How should welds or piping segment areas in the inspection sample be selected for inspection: randomly,

those most likely to experience degradation, or some combination of random and possible degradation? What would be the basis for the recommended selection process?

(E) Once selected, should the same welds or piping segment areas be inspected at each inspection interval or should different welds or piping segment areas be included in the sample? What would be the basis?

(F) DG-1063 proposes a method for meeting the criteria for acceptable safety and quality, as addressed in 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3)(I). That method applies leak frequency target goals to maintain piping performance levels at or improved over the existing performance observed when implementing ASME Section XI requirements. Are there other acceptable risk-informed means by which to meet the criteria in 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3)(I)?

(G) Should the scope of DG-1063 permit licensees to propose ISI changes to selected systems, in lieu of assessing the entire piping in the plant? For example, would it be acceptable for a licensee to limit its analysis to Class 1 piping (reactor coolant system piping) and not consider other piping in the plant? Such an analysis would not provide information required for categorizing piping in the plant and thereby grading the inspection based on plant risk. It would also discourage the use of risk-insights (e.g., PRA) to identify risk-significant piping within the plant. How can the concept of assessing risk in an integrated fashion be maintained if the scope were limited to one or a limited number of systems, such as Class 1 piping. What is gained by analyzing all the systems versus only selected systems? What is lost by minimizing the scope?

(H) The decision metrics described in Attachment 2 to DG-1063 identify a 2-by-2 matrix for identifying a graded approach to inspection based on risk and failure potential. Piping segments categorized as high-safety-significant and high-failure-potential receive more inspections than segments categorized as high-safety-significant and low-failure-potential. The number of inspections for the high-safety-significant and low-failure-potential segments is based on meeting target leak frequency goals and incorporates uncertainties in the probability of detection. What other methods are available to provide a comparable level of quality and safety? What are the technical bases for those other methods?

(I) How should the time dependence of degradation mechanisms be accounted for in selecting inspection

intervals and categorizing the safety significance of pipe segments?

(J) On what basis could the requirement for ISI be eliminated? For example, if a detailed engineering analysis identifies a Class 1 or 2 piping segment as low-safety-significant and low-failure-potential, is it acceptable to eliminate the requirement for ISI or should a Class 1 or a 2 pipe segment be considered part of the defense-in-depth consideration and be required to have some level of inspection regardless of its categorization as low-safety-significant and low-failure potential? If yes, why? If not, why not?

(K) Are data bases available on degradation mechanisms and consequences of piping failures? Is data available to identify the secondary effects that can result from a pipe break, such as high-energy pipe whip damaging other piping and components in the vicinity of the break? What are the industry's plans for developing and maintaining an up-to-date data base on plant piping performance? Should a commitment to develop and maintain such a data base be required for a RI-ISI program? How could it be ensured that the data base is maintained?

(L) Does the application of the Perdue-Abramson model (DG-1063, Attachment 4), with the use of the decision metrics and leak frequency goals (DG-1063, Attachment 2) provide an alternative acceptable level of quality and safety as required by 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3)(I)? Alternatively, should there be a leak frequency goal independent of core damage frequency goal, as a measure of defense in depth?

(M) Is the guidance proposed by the staff for finding a fracture mechanics computer model acceptable for use in RI-ISI programs clear and adequate? If not, what is missing?

(N) Is the guidance on risk categorization clear and sufficient, or is additional guidance needed? What additional guidance is needed?

(O) Table A5.1, in DG-1063, identifies a proposed checklist that could assist in identifying potential locations for various degradation mechanisms in a pipe. Is this checklist complete? What additional information could enhance the usefulness of such a check list?

Workshop Meeting Information

A 2-day workshop will be held to obtain public comment on the subject draft Regulatory Guide (DG-1063) and the accompanying draft standard review plan (Section 3.9.8), and to respond to questions. Persons other than NRC staff and NRC contractors interested in making a presentation at the workshop should notify Jack Guttman, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, MS T10E50, phone (301) 415-7732, e-mail jxg@nrc.gov. Comments on the regulatory guidance and standard review plan documents for discussion at the workshop should be submitted in writing and in electronic mail (JXG@nrc.gov) in WordPerfect 5 or 6.1 compatible format.

Date: November 19-20, 1997.

Agenda: Preliminary agenda is as follows: (A final agenda will be available at the workshop.)

Tuesday, November 18, 1997

Time—3:00 pm to 7:00 pm.
Registration.

Wednesday, November 19, 1997

Time—7:00 am to 4:00 pm.
Registration.

Session 1: (Morning 11/19/97—8:00 am–11:30 am)

Overview by NRC management of the draft regulatory guide and standard review plan, followed by NRC staff presentation on the draft documents (DG-1063 and SRP Section 3.9.8).

Lunch: 11:30 am—1:00 pm.

Session 2: (Afternoon 11/19/97—1:00 pm–5:00 pm)

Public/Industry presentations on issues and recommendations for the general guidance documents, followed by open discussions.

Friday, November 20, 1997

Session 3: (Morning 11/20/97—8:00 am–11:30 pm)

Open discussion of issues.

Session 4: (Afternoon 11/20/97—1:00 pm–3:00 pm)

Overview of comments, issues and resolution options identified in the sessions. Concluding remarks and near-term plans will be covered by the staff.

Location: Bethesda, Maryland.

Hotel: Bethesda Marriott, 5151 Pooks Hill Road, Bethesda, Maryland, (301) 897-9400.

Registration: There is no registration fee for this workshop. However, we request that interested parties register in writing to Kesselman-Jones, 8912 James Ave., NE., Albuquerque, New Mexico 87111 their intent on participating in the workshop. Please include name, organization, address and phone number with your registration request. Notification of attendance (e.g., pre-registration) is requested so that adequate space, etc. for the workshop can be arranged. Questions regarding meeting registration or fees should be directed to Kesselman-Jones, Phone (505) 271-0003, fax (505) 271-0482, e-mail kessjones@aol.com.

VI. Regulatory Analysis

1. Statement of the Problem

During the past several years, both the Commission and the nuclear industry have recognized that probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) has evolved to the point that it can be used increasingly as a tool in regulatory decisionmaking. In August 1995 the Commission published a policy statement that articulated the view that increased use of PRA technology would (1) enhance regulatory decisionmaking, (2) allow for a more efficient use of agency resources, and (3) allow a reduction in unnecessary burdens on licensees. In order for this change in regulatory approach to occur, guidance must be developed describing acceptable means for increasing the use of PRA information in the regulation of nuclear power reactors.

2. Objective

To provide guidance to power reactor licensees and NRC staff reviewers on acceptable approaches for utilizing risk information (PRA) to support requests for changes in a plant's current licensing basis (CLB). It is intended that the changes in regulatory approach addressed by this guidance should allow a focussing of both industry and NRC staff resources on the most important regulatory areas while providing for a reduction in burden on the resources of licensees. Specifically, guidance is to be provided in several areas that have been identified as having potential for this application. This application includes risk-informed inservice inspection programs of piping.

3. Alternatives

The increased use of PRA information as described in the draft regulatory guide being developed for this purpose is voluntary. Licensees can continue to operate their plants under the existing procedures defined in their CLB. It is expected that licensees will choose to make changes in their current licensing bases to use the new approaches described in the draft regulatory guide only if it is perceived to be to their benefit to do so.

4. Consequences

Acceptance guidelines included in the draft regulatory guide state that only small increases in overall risk are to be allowed under the risk-informed program. Reducing the inspection frequency of piping identified to represent low risk and low failure potential as provided for under this program is an example of a potential contributor to a small increase in plant

risk. However, the program also requires increased emphasis on piping categorized as high-safety-significant and high-failure-potential that may not be inspected under current programs. This is an example of a potential contributor to decreases in plant risk. An improved prioritization of industry and NRC staff resources, such that the most important areas associated with plant safety receive increased attention, should result in a corresponding contributor to a reduction in risk. Some of the possible impacts on plant risk cannot be readily quantified using present PRA techniques and must be evaluated qualitatively. The staff believes that the net effect of the risk changes associated with the risk-informed programs, as allowed using the guidelines in the draft regulatory guide, should result in a very small increase in risk, maintain a risk-neutral condition, or result in a net risk reduction in some cases.

5. Decision Rationale

It is believed that the changes in regulatory approach provided for in the draft regulatory guide being developed will result in a significant improvement in the allocation of resources both for the NRC and for the industry. At the same time, it is believed that this program can be implemented while maintaining an adequate level of safety at the plants that choose to implement risk-informed programs.

6. Implementation

It is intended that the risk-informed regulatory guide on inservice inspection of piping (DG-1063) be published by early to mid CY 1998.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 8th day of October 1997.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Mark A. Cunningham,

Chief, Probabilistic Risk Analysis Branch.

[FR Doc. 97-27235 Filed 10-14-97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

NUCLEAR WASTE TECHNICAL REVIEW BOARD

Panel Meeting: November 19-20, 1997—Arlington, Virginia: Spent Nuclear Fuel Transportation Safety

Pursuant to its authority under section 5051 of Public Law 100-203, the Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1987, the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board's Panel on the Waste Management System will hold a meeting November 19-20, 1997, beginning at 8:30 a.m. The meeting, which is open to the public, will focus

on transportation safety issues for spent nuclear fuel.

The first day will include presentations on the federal regulatory framework under which transportation will take place, transportation planning and practices (using a specific example), and risk analysis (with emphasis on methodologies). Representatives from the Department of Transportation, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Sandia National Laboratories, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory have been invited to make the presentations, along with several private consultants. On the second day, the presenters will participate in a round-table discussion of their topics. Representatives of the state of Nevada, the environmental community, the Department of Energy, and other stakeholder groups also will participate. The meeting will end around noon. A detailed agenda will be available approximately two weeks prior to the meeting by fax or email, or on the Board's web site at www.nwtrb.gov.

The meeting will be held at the Sheraton national Hotel, Columbia Pike & Washington Boulevard, Arlington, Virginia 22204; (Tel) 703-521-1900; (Fax) 703-521-0332. Reservations for accommodations must be made by October 17, 1997, and you must indicate that you are attending the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board's panel meeting to receive the preferred rate.

Time has been set aside on the agenda for comments and questions from the public. Those wishing to speak are encouraged to sign the Public Comment Register at the check-in table. A time limit may have to be set on the length of individual remarks; however, written comments of any length may be submitted for the record.

Transcripts of this meeting will be available on computer disk, via e-mail, or on a library-loan basis in paper format from Davonya Barnes, Board staff, beginning December 18, 1997. For further information, contact Frank Randall, External Affairs, 2300 Clarendon Blvd., Suite 1300, Arlington, Virginia 22201-3367; (Tel) 703-235-4473; (Fax) 703-235-4495; (E-mail) info@nwtrb.gov.

The Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board was created by Congress in the Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1987 to evaluate the technical and scientific validity of activities undertaken by the DOE in its program to manage the disposal of the nation's high-level radioactive waste and commercial spent nuclear fuel. In that same legislation, Congress directed the DOE to characterize a site at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, for its suitability as